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NOTICE 
Every Move You Make: How Stories Shape the 
Law of Stalking 
Anna-Rose Mathieson 
EVERY BREATH You TAKE: STALKING NARRATIVES AND THE LAW. 
By Orit Kamir. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 2001. 
Pp. ix, 245. $50. 
INTRODUCTION 
"Bunny-boiler" is now an official part of the English language.1 
This word - taken from the scene in Fatal Attraction2 where Glenn 
Close's character boils the pet rabbit of the man she has been stalking3  
- was unknown fifteen years ago. Although still not in common 
parlance, "bunny-boiler" has made its way far enough into our culture 
that a brief explanation of its source can conjure up an image of the 
obsessive, vindictive stalker it describes.4 Along with the entrance of 
this word into our language has come an explosive growth in laws 
punishing stalkers. Before 1990, no state in the nation had an anti­
stalking law. Now every state does.5 
1. Or, at least, it was just added to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. See Blairite 
and Jedi Enter Dictionary, BBC NEWS, Sept. 27, 2002, at http://news.bbc.eo.uk/1/hi/uk/ 
2282572.stm (last visited Mar. 3, 2003). 
2. FATAL ATTRACTION (Paramount Pictures 1987). 
3. The word "stalking," when used to describe this type of conduct, is itself a recent 
addition to our language. Until the late 1970s, references to "stalking" were generally lim­
ited to the wholesome sports of deerhunting and boxing, activities that Kamir suggests are 
characteristic of American manhood. P. 146. In the media flurry over the serial killer known 
as Son of Sam, however, the press seized on the term "stalking" to describe the killer's mo­
dus operandi, and soon "stalking" became a common description of the obsessive activities 
of serial killers and rapists. Pp. 146-48. And now "stalking" is pervasive - as one commenta­
tor put it, stalking is the "crime of the nineties." Gregor Krause, Stalking: The Crime of the 
Nineties, ALBUQUERQUE MAG., Jan. 1993, at 26. 
4. A Google search of "bunny-boiler" turned up 1,370 hits as of March 2, 2003, includ­
ing sites where disgruntled girlfriends could request a Glenn Close-type to stalk their 
boyfriends via cell phone (http://www.rabbit-on.com/girlfriend_boil.php); the "Bunny-Boiler 
Bordello" of paintings by a manic-depressive (http://www.timoldham.co.uk); and lyrics to 
the song Bunny Boiler by an obscure German rock band (http://www.purelyrics.com/index. 
php?lyrics=ibxcicmy ). 
5. The federal government does as well, although there is some concern over whether 
this is a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause authority. The federal anti-stalking 
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In Every Breath You Take: Stalking Narratives and the Law,6 
Orit Kamir7 traces the development of stalking narratives through 
Sumerian mythology, British literature, and modern cinema, showing 
how Glenn Close's bunny-boiling character is merely the latest incar­
nation of an ancient archetype.8 Kamir argues that these stories of 
stalking influence societal attitudes even though we may not be 
conscious of the stories themselves (p. 3). Through this historical and 
literary exploration Kamir answers by illustration one of her central 
questions: "(W)hat, in the broad, cultural sense, is stalking?" (p. 1). 
Yet the legal implications of this inquiry are not immediately 
apparent. The bulk of the book - 174 out of 215 pages - is devoted 
to literary analysis of stalking narratives, with a short discussion of law 
at the end. Kamir's critique is insightful and entertaining, but what 
exactly does the law have to learn from an analysis of Fatal Attraction? 
The answer is twofold.9 First, although there have been scores of 
law review articles describing, analyzing, and criticizing the legal sys­
tem's approach to stalking, Kamir's account is unique in the way her 
detailed examination of stalking narratives explains the unconscious 
preconceptions that make us describe, analyze, and criticize stalking 
law the way we do. Second, stalking narratives fuel the fear of stalking 
that leads society to criminalize it, and even affect the definition of the 
crime itself. Since the legal definition of stalking uses the "reasonable 
person test" - assessing the fears and reactions of a typical person to 
determine whether actions constitute criminal stalking - stalking sto­
ries affect the scope of stalking statutes by shaping the subconscious 
fears of the "average" member of the community. 
law is a component of the Violence Against Women Act ("VA WA"), which was partially 
struck down in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating component of 
Act that created a federal civil remedy). The circuit courts that have examined VAWA's 
anti-stalking provision so far have concluded it is constitutional. See, e.g., United States v. 
Al-Zubaidy, 283 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2002). 
6. The title presumably comes from the Police song, which croons "Every breath you 
take/Every move you make/Every bond you break/Every step you take/I'll be watching 
you." POLICE, Every Breath You Take, on SYNCHRONICITY (A&M Records 1983). This ap­
pears to be a popular title for stalking literature. See, e.g., ANN RULE, EVERY BREATH You 
TAKE: A TRUE STORY OF OBSESSION, REVENGE, AND MURDER (2001 ). 
7. Faculty of Law, Hebrew University, Jerusalem; Visiting Professor of Law, University 
of Michigan Law School, Winter 2004. 
8. Kamir uses "archetype" not in its Jungian sense as an image embedded in the human 
psyche, but instead as a metaphor for "culturally created images." P. 19 n.l. 
9. In both of these points, Kamir's intellectual debt to University of Michigan Law 
School Professor James Boyd White is evident. Professor White, who served as one of 
Kamir's dissertation advisors, pioneered the field of law and literature with the publication 
of The Legal Imagination in 1973. See also, e.g., JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS 
TRANSLATION (1990). This might, perhaps, be a good point to mention my own great debt 
to Professor White, one of my mentors throughout law school and advisor for the project 
that formed the nucleus of this Book Notice. 
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This Notice explains how Kamir's eloquent examination of stalking 
narratives provides numerous lessons for scholars willing to actively 
search out the legal implications. Part I gives an overview of the book, 
focusing on Kamir's analysis of archetypical male and female stalkers, 
and on the recent wave of stalking laws enacted throughout the 
nation. Part II scrutinizes the relationship between stalking and fear, 
analyzing the ways in which stalking narratives create and shape the 
fear that defines the behavior that society punishes as criminal 
stalking. Part III turns to Kamir's central legal argument - a critique 
of the reasonable person standard in stalking law - and explains how 
her attack on this standard is more broadly applicable than she sug­
gests. Finally, Part IV examines Kamir's suggestion for avoiding the 
problems caused by the reasonable person standard, and argues that 
her solution - entrusting the legislature to define the underlying 
value judgments of stalking law - is attractive in theory but flawed in 
practice. Given the societal conflicts Kamir describes in the first half 
of her book, a jury's case-specific inquiry is better than sweeping 
legislative judgments. 
I. WITCHES & VA MPIRES 
Kamir divides stalking narratives by the gender of the stalker,10 
and spends two chapters for each gender showing how stalking narra­
tives evolved through different eras and cultures.11 Throughout all, 
Kamir employs the language and vocabulary of feminism. Describing 
the horror flick Halloween, for instance, she explains how "[t]he 
stalker, no longer mama's castrated boy, is now evil incarnate, over­
powered by a stronger woman of his own generation" and sums up the 
plot by saying "the pure virgin-mother Laurie battles the bloodthirsty 
vampire, survives his attacks, and liberates her community" (pp. 159; 
157). In another instance she attempts to translate the arguments of 
Jean-Paul Sartre into feminist terms, explaining that Sartre can be in­
terpreted as arguing that "the 'vulvaless' imageless male God cannot 
give birth to humans, nor create unity and intimacy; he, therefore, 
creates abstractly, using language" (pp. 81-82). With this feminist 
10. There is a fundamental difference between narratives involving male and female 
stalkers. P.3; compare chapters 2, and 3 (discussing female stalkers), with chapters 4, and 5 
(male stalkers). Dividing stalking by the gender of the perpetrator roughly divides it by the 
gender of the victim as well, since most stalkers - both male and female, real and fictional 
- stalk the opposite sex. Not all, however, do. See, e.g., ANNE RICE, INTERVIEW WITH THE 
VAMPIRE (1976). 
11. She punctuates this analysis with six short appendices that are tangentially but 
intriguingly related to her main discussion. One appendix, for instance, reprints the first 
chapter of Varney the Vampire, a sensational serial from 1840s England. Pp. 109-11; see also 
pp. 98-99 for Kamir's analysis of the lessons to be learned from Varney. Other appendices 
include "On the (Un)Approachability of Antiquity," App. 2.1, and "The Literary Summer of 
1816: Lamb, Shelly, Byron, and Polidori," App 5.1. 
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analysis she reveals how the types of stories told about stalkers depend 
upon which gender is cast as the aggressor. 
The quintessential female stalker is the mythological character of 
Lilit - a "dark, long-haired, night-flying she-devil" (p. 19). The 
stalking she-devil first appears in ancient Mesopotamian myths; Kamir 
argu¥S that this frightening character was created by patriarchal rulers 
in an attempt to subvert earlier stories of powerful female goddesses.12 
To control the earlier and more benevolent images of women, the 
patriarchy invented stories that cast powerful women as evil witches, 
baby-snatchers, sorceresses, and succubae (pp. 30-32). In these new 
stories, "[f]emale stalking is felt as repetitively returning, sexual, 
seducing, terrifying, and guilt inducing" (pp. 4-5). 
Male stalkers appear in a wider and more popular variety of narra­
tives than female stalkers; the range spans from Doctor Faust to "the 
biblical God's watchful, ever-present, and unseen eye" (p. 68). The 
vampire is the archetypical male stalker, and also "our culture's most 
popular and interesting stalker."13 In these stories, "male stalking of a 
woman objectifies her, posing her as 'matter' for her stalker's 
subjecting, controlling gaze. It undermines her subjectivity, dehuman­
izing and humiliating her" (p. 208). Stories involving male stalkers are 
also used as tools of control by the patriarchal social order, but in a 
different way than stories of female stalkers. While the latter stories 
serve as a cohesive force for men by suggesting that female power and 
sexuality are inextricably linked to evil (p. 42), stories of male stalkers 
enforce societal norms by punishing those who stray from the main­
stream (p. 68). 
In general, archetypes of both male and female stalkers peacefully 
coexist in society's collective unconscious.14 From time to time, how­
ever, fear of these figures erupts in waves of panic. In these periods of 
panic, the population becomes obsessed with a "phenomenon that is 
irrationally perceived as exceptionally dangerous to the collective 
well-being" (pp. 5; 51-67). Witch-hunts, for instance, erupt when fear 
of female stalkers comes to a boil. Harmless personal characteristics, 
like owning a black cat or having a warty nose, can take on a sinister 
aspect when they fit the image of an evil character described in stories. 
12. P. 30; see also pp. 19-32. Kamir explains in great detail how "the Great Goddess of 
antiquity was conquered and replaced by patriarchy's omnipotent male God." P. 20. 
13. P. 77. Movies involving male stalkers include BRAM STOKER'S DRACULA 
(Columbia Pictures 1992) and SILENCE OF THE LAMBS (Orion Pictures 1991). But see FATAL 
ATTRACTION (Paramount Pictures 1987). Male stalkers are even good material for a theme 
park. See Perhaps No Home Soil for Dracula, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2003, at AS (describing 
how conservationists have blocked plans to build a Dracula theme park, complete with 
amusement rides, a golf course, and a spooky Gothic castle, in the hometown of Vlad 
the Impaler (the model for Dracula); the developers now plan to build the park outside 
Bucharest). 
14. For Jung's explanation of the collective unconscious, see CARL GUSTAV JUNG, 9 
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF C. G. JUNG (R.F. Hull & Michael Fordham eds., 1980). 
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Kamir argues that our society·is currently in the midst of one of 
these moral panics (pp. 140-74). The current wave of alarm first 
became visible in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as there was a verita­
ble cultural renaissance of stalking stories.15 Along with these stories, 
well-publicized incidents of real stalkers16 fueled societal fear (p. 141). 
This fear spurred passage of anti-stalking laws in every state, yet these 
laws "served only to amplify" societal panic (p. 175). 
After describing this panic, Kamir argues that our fear of stalking 
is overblown in proportion to the actual threat (pp. 194-98). Kamir 
slightly overstates some of her arguments about the current moral 
panic to prove this point; while our society may be more concerned 
about stalking now than fifty years ago, it is nothing like the full-blown 
panic of the Salem witch trials,17 or, for that matter, the vampire hunts 
that are currently causing panic in Malawi.18 Mini-panics may follow 
publicity over real cases of stalking, but there is not a sustained, 
overwhelming obsession with stalking. 
Kamir argues that in our frenzy to deal with the perceived threat of 
stalkers, we have passed anti-stalking laws that are underinclusive of 
the actual threat (pp. 181-86). The California anti-stalking statute, for 
instance - the first one in the nation and a model for later statutes -
punishes "[a]ny person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly 
follows or harasses another person and who makes a credible threat 
with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of death or 
great bodily injury."19 Under this definition, Ted Bundy, Son of Sam, 
and Dracula - men whom Kamir .suggests fit the classic image of a 
stalker - would not be deemed guilty of criminal stalking. None of 
these classic stalkers "harassed" their victims before the crimes, since 
"harassment" within the meaning of the statute requires a course of 
conduct over some extended period of time (p. 182). Indeed, even the 
real-life "stalker" who is generally considered the catalyst for modern 
ariti-stalking legislation would not be guilty under this definition.2 0  
15. Such as Robert DeNiro's character in Taxi Driver, pp. 141-43, and the films 
Halloween, pp. 156-60, and Fatal Attraction, pp. 171-74. 
16. Particularly Son of Sam, pp. 143•48, and Ted Bundy, pp. 148-49. 
17. See generally FRANCES HILL, A DELUSION OF SATAN: THE FULL STORY OF THE 
SALEM WITCH TRIALS (1995); MARION L. STARKEY, THE DEVIL IN MASSACHUSETTS: A 
MODERN ENQUIRY INTO THE SALEM WITCH TRIALS (1969). 
18. See Rachel L. Swarns, Not Your Usual Vampires, but Scary Nonetheless, N.Y. TIMES. 
Jan. 14, 2003, at A4 (describing how Malawi "is in the grip of a form of hysteria" over men in 
black clothing who strike at night, drugging their victims and draining their blood), available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/0l/14/international/africa/14VAMP.html. 
19. P. 182; CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(a) (2003). The punishment is a maximum of one 
year and/or a fine of $1,000. 
20. Pp. 182-83. This man is Robert Bardo, who stalked and killed actress Rebecca 
Schaeffer in California. Pp. 175-79. 
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It is certainly true that current stalking laws are not precisely tai­
lored to capture all stalking behavior. Some of the underinclusiveness 
that Kamir laments, however, is directly related to the way the earlier 
part of the book answered the question of "[W]hat, in the broad, 
cultural sense, is stalking?" (p. 1). The crime of stalking may be 
underinclusive of what we describe as stalking because the word 
"stalking" is itself overinclusive of what we believe should be punished 
as criminal. The fact that stalking laws do not punish everyone whom 
Kamir has labeled as a "stalker" does not in itself prove that the 
legislature negligently drafted underinclusive laws; it could instead be 
a legislative judgment that some "stalkers" are better dealt with under 
existing murder and assault statutes.21 
It is also unclear if the legislative response is as haphazard and in­
coherent as Kamir portrays. The initial wave of statutes were, of 
course, hastily passed - all fifty states and the federal government 
passed anti-stalking laws within a three-year period (p. 1). Kamir is 
quite right that this rush may have "rendered [the statutes] incapable 
of properly addressing many types of stalking, including those very 
types [they] supposedly set out to address" (pp. 181-82). But while the 
initial stalking laws may have been passed in a frantic flurry, most 
states have been revising these laws as the flaws that Kamir points out 
become more obvious.2 2 Kamir primarily focuses on the California 
anti-stalking statute - which happens to be one that has not been 
substantially revised since its passage - and spends only a single 
paragraph describing the statutes of other states (pp. 184-85). Because 
of this focus on California, Kamir glosses over the conscientious 
attempts made by many other states to fine-tune their statutes. 
II. CREA TING FEAR, CREATING CRIME 
The legal definition of stalking criminalizes a pattern of conduct, 
not a single act. Considered separately, many of the individual acts 
that together constitute stalking are subject to punishment already.23 A 
21. Indeed, as Kamir explains elsewhere, the majority of law review articles responded 
to the initial wave of underinclusive statutes by arguing that the laws were unconstitutionally 
vague and that the crime should "be redefined so that the law would capture even fewer 
types of stalking." P. 185. At least one court has agreed, see Commonwealth v. Kwiatkowski, 
637 N.E.2d 854 (Mass. 1994), while others have found the state statutes constitutional, see 
Marjorie A. Caner, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Stalking Statutes, 
29 A.LR.5th 487 (1995 & Supp. 2003) (collecting cases). 
22. See, e.g., J. Thomas Kirkman, Every Breath You Take: Massachusetts Steps up Its 
Efforts to Stop Stalkers, 85 MASS. L. REV. 174, 176 (describing the gradual evolution of 
Massachusetts's anti-stalking laws after a hasty enactment); Development: Criminal Law and 
Procedure: Stalking Amendments, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 1156, 1156-57 (explaining how Utah's 
anti-stalking law was first passed in 1992, and amended in 1994, 1996, and 1999, each time 
making it more effective). 
23. Harassment, for instance, typically covers making "a telephone call without purpose 
of legitimate communication" or "any other course of alarming conduct serving no legit.i-
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stalker who boils the pet bunny of his24 target, for instance, can be 
punished for trespass, conversion, and intentional infliction of emo­
tional distress. While overcriminalization is certainly rampant in our 
legal system,25 however, anti-stalking laws do not merely give prosecu­
tors another basic charge to heap upon someone accused of a violent 
act. Instead, anti-stalking laws can be used to punish the repetition of 
otherwise "innocent" behavior - repeated phone calls; excessive, 
obsessive love letters; watching someone from afar.26 
What is the harm in the repetition of behavior that transforms 
conduct from merely annoying to criminal stalking? Is it just that soci­
ety worries that this obsessive behavior is a sign that the stalker will 
soon progress to more serious physical harm? This may be some of the 
concern, but there is more at stake than the desire to preventatively 
incapacitate the stalker before he commits an actual act of violence.27 
The legislative record surrounding the passage of state and federal 
anti-stalking statutes suggests that we would punish stalking even if we 
knew no violent crime would result. Stalking causes fear of what might 
happen next, yet we punish it not just to prevent the crime that might 
happen, but also for causing the fear itself. 
Not many crimes are explicitly linked to fear in this way. Of the 
few that are, the correlation is often a side effect. We punish 
attempted murder, for instance, because it shows the culprit had a bad 
mind and the willingness to act upon it, not just because of the fear it 
caused the victim - we would consider the criminal as culpable even 
if the intended victim never learned her life was in danger.28 While 
assault does punish conduct because of the fear it causes, it is a much 
mate purpose." MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.4 (2001). Indeed, many of the individual inci­
dents could be prosecuted twice or thrice over given the overcriminalization of American 
law. Thus, "'[s]talking is a complicated crime to pursue. Because of the level of proof re­
quired by many state stalking laws, it's often easier to pursue a different, related crime, such 
as assault ....  ' "  Janet L. Holt, Interstate Stalking Ban Survives Constitutional Challenge in 
Sixth Circuit, TRIAL, July 2002, at 90, 92 (quoting Diane Alexander of the Stalking Resource 
Center). 
24. Following Kamir's usage, this Notice uses female pronouns to refer to stalking vic­
tims and male pronouns for stalkers. 
25. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
505 (2001). 
26. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Bradfield, Anti-Stalking Laws: Do They Adequately Protect 
Stalking Victims?, 21 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 229, 234 (1998) ("While individual acts may not 
be criminal in isolation, combined they may constitute an illegal pattern of behavior. . . . "). 
27. Indeed, if this were the true motivation, it would raise several serious due process 
issues. Cf Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). In an ironic twist, the need for preven­
tative incapacitation can actually be addressed by "stalking" the stalker. Police can use ankle 
devices equipped with G.P.S. monitors to track every detail of a convicted stalker's move­
ments. See Eric Chabrow, Every Move You Make, Every Breath You Take, 
INFORMA TIONWEEK, Aug. 30, 2002, at http://www.informationweek.com/story/ 
IWK20020830S0027 (last visited Oct. 27, 2002). 
28. The effect upon the victim may sometimes be considered in sentencing, however, 
and often is tacitly included in a jury's determination. 
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more concentrated, definable fear than stalking. We can specifically 
describe what the victim was afraid of - getting punched in the face 
or stabbed with a knife - so this fear can be discussed and evaluated 
semi-objectively.29 Although we may never have been punched in the 
face, we have at least experienced some analogous type of physical 
fright and felt the gut-wrenching sensation of fear. 
Stalking is.different. It is hard to define what the victim is afraid of, 
and often there are no specific acts of the stalker that we can identify 
as the direct cause of fear. This is where Kamir's detailed examination 
of legal narrative helps us understand the law, because narratives of 
stalking help construct the fear that causes our society to criminalize 
stalking. 
First, stalking stories shape the way we perceive patterns of 
conduct. An obsessed, ex-boyfriend is transformed from someone we 
pity into someone we fear because we have read so many newspaper 
articles in which these seemingly pathetic figures have snapped. If 
innocent actions fit into the patterns we have learned from stalking 
narratives, we suspect the actions are not truly innocent. Indeed, it was 
the explosion of media stories following an actual incident of stalking 
- an obsessed fan stalked and killed actress Rebecca Schaeffer -
that was the primary catalyst for the first anti-stalking law in the 
United States.30 This murderer perfectly fit the archetypal image of a 
stalker, so both the population and politicians panicked. It is eerie to 
have fact conform to fiction, particularly when the genre is horror. 
And in a rush to appear to be doing something to solve the problem, 
legislatures tailored the new anti-stalking laws to punish the mythical 
stalkers that our culture fears instead of dealing with the reality of 
stalking in America (p. 175). 
Second, stories of stalking manufacture fear through emotional 
manipulation. This process is particularly visible in horror films, for 
"the emotional manipulation of film teaches viewers .. .  to expect that 
stalkers, both male and female, might hunt them in real life" (p. 116). 
The fictional nature of horror films is obvious, yet who is not a little 
uneasy at being alone in a dark house after watching a particularly 
29. In assault crimes, the victim can describe the conduct that caused him fear. This is 
true for both the crime and tort of assault, which punish conduct that raises a "reasonable 
apprehension of imminent battery." See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 34 (2000). 
30. Rebecca Schaffer's killer was dubbed by US News & World Reports as " 'the arche­
typal stalker.'" P. 177. Kamir presents this as the theory accepted by almost all other schol­
ars, but challenges the validity of the explanation herself. Pp. 175-79; see also, e.g., Nancy K. 
D. Lemon, Domestic Violence & Stalking: A Comment on the Model Anti-Stalking Code 
Proposed by the National Institute of Justice (1994) ("Popular myth has attributed the moti­
vation for this statute to be the stalking/homicide of Rebecca Schaeffer. . .. (but] the statute 
actually has its roots in domestic violence."), at http://www.vaw.umn.edu/BWJP/stalking.htm 
(last visited Apr. 13, 2003). She does agree, however, that the California law was the catalyst 
for every other state to enact an anti-stalking law within the next three years. P. 1. 
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scary film? By showing how danger can be everywhere - even 
fictional danger - stalking narratives train us how and what to fear. 
Finally, stalking stories affect the actual experience of the victim. If 
you were to discover tomorrow that someone was taking an obsessive 
interest in you, you would likely become more attentive to stalking 
narratives. Movies that were once entertaining would become real and 
frightening as you began to see parallels to your own experience. 
Conduct that might otherwise seem innocent would take on a new di­
mension when following the traditional patterns of stalking narratives. 
Fear would feed your attention to stalking stories, which in turn would 
fuel your fear, for "the fear of stalking within our culture is a product 
of an ongoing interaction between fears and the stories told about 
them" (p. 3). And this fear is a legally cognizable element of the crime 
of stalking. 31 
III. THE REASONABLE PERSON & THE STALKING VICTIM 
Perhaps the most interesting legal application of Kamir's research 
is on the reasonable person test built into most definitions of stalking. 
Unlike most other crimes, anti-stalking laws generally apply this stan­
dard to the victim's reactions, not the defendant's conduct. The 
California statute requires that the stalker's course of conduct "must 
be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional dis­
tress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the per­
son." 32 
Kamir argues that this use of the reasonable person standard to 
test the rationality of the victim's fear places the victim in the place 
usually occupied by the person on trial - it subtly suggests the 
victim's guilt by judging her emotional reactions to determine if they 
were "reasonable" (pp. 188-89). By requiring the jury to determine 
both what the actual victim felt and what a reasonable person would 
feel, Kamir argues that the victim's actions are subjected to scrutiny 
and judgment in a manner reminiscent of the archetypal male stalker's 
piercing gaze.3 3  
31. P .  184. Although Kamir only considers the relationship between stalking and crimi­
nal law, filing a civil claim against a stalker is another possibility for victims. See, e.g., Seema 
Zeya, Civil Lawsuits and Safety Planning for Stalking Victims, 44 ADVOCATE, June 2001, at 
23. Pursuing only civil claims, however, can pose substantial risks of retaliation from the 
stalker. See id. (providing warning signs of escalating danger and practical safety tips for 
those filing civil claims against stalkers). Permanent injunctions are another possibility, and 
several states offer these at no cost to the victim. See, e.g., Development: Criminal Law and 
Procedure, supra note 22, at 1158. 
32. P. 182 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(e) (West Supp. 1998)) (emphasis added). 
33. P. 188 (describing the reasonable person standard as "the male stalker par excel­
lence of the legal world's stories"). 
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The "reasonable victim" standard is used more often than Kamir 
suggests; her discussion leaves the reader with the impression that it is 
only used in cases tinged with gender and racial bias, such as stalking, 
sexual harassment, and hostile work environment claims. 34 Yet this 
standard finds frequent use in torts such as assault and intentional in­
fliction of emotional distress. 35 To recover for the tort of assault, for 
instance, the victim must prove he felt a "reasonable apprehension" of 
unwanted physical touching.36 To be sure, the "reasonable victim" 
standard is not always augmented with a subjective requirement that 
the victim prove that he felt fear as well. If someone throws a punch at 
you and misses, as long as you were aware that the punch was thrown 
we allow recovery for assault, even if through foolish bravado you felt 
no fear.37 Yet it is unclear why judging the victim's fear in comparison 
to the fear a reasonable person would feel is any more intrusive than 
judging the victim's other sensations in comparison to a reasonable 
person's. And it seems even more intrusive to judge the victim's 
actions - which is, in a sense, what we do for the victim of an assault 
who reacts with deadly force in self-defense. 
Many states make the availability of a self-defense claim turn on 
the objective reasonableness of the action.38 The assault victim - who 
now finds himself on trial for murder - is explicitly held up in 
comparison to the objective reasonableness standard: his actions are 
justified only if his fear was reasonable and his reactions proportional 
to the force a reasonable person would use. Indeed, if as Kamir argues 
the stalking victim is harmed by the mere act of scrutinizing her 
actions, a murder defendant who claims he acted in self-defense is hurt 
even more; not only does the jury pass on the reasonableness of his 
reaction, but that determination is literally the dividing line between 
guilt and innocence. The law not only compares his action to the 
model of an "ideal average man" - scrutinizing his instincts and 
judging him in comparison to a fictional construct - but condemns 
him if he does not live up to that fictional standard. 
34. Kamir never asserts this directly, but the implication is drawn from her characteriza­
tion of this standard as "rare" coupled with her description of the few instances when the 
standard is used. 
35. See DOBBS, supra note 29, at 33-34. See generally Richard Restak, The Fiction of the 
"Reasonable Man", WASH. POST., May 17, 1987, at C3 (criticizing that standard). 
36. DOBBS, supra note 29, at § 34 n.7. 
37. Id. § 34 & nn.1-2 (citing PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 10). 
38. The MODEL PENAL CODE ("MPC") does not incorporate a requirement that the 
victim's fear be reasonable, just that it be honest. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(c) 
(2001). Most states, however, require that the fear be objectively as well as subjectively rea­
sonable. See People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986) (concluding that the New York 
legislature clearly rejected the MPC approach and incorporated an objective test of reason­
ableness into the definition of self-defense); SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. 
SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 801-14 (6th ed. 1995). 
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Indeed, every use of the reasonable person test as applied to the 
defendant takes place before the determination of guilt and serves to 
commute innocent activity into culpability or liability. If legal scrutiny 
using the reasonable person test is akin to the domineering gaze of a 
male stalker - an experience that Kamir argues is harmful in itself -
is it fair to subject anyone to this ordeal?39 Kamir's critique is broader 
than she casts it: her arguments are not limited to stalking, but apply 
generally to the use of a reasonable person standard to evaluate crimi­
nal and tortious conduct.40 
Despite its potential harms, however, the reasonable person stan­
dard "allows for an interesting integration, in the real-world setting of 
the courtroom, of the legal stalking story with fictional narratives of 
stalking" (p. 192). The average person called to serve on a jury in a 
stalking case has probably never experienced firsthand the terror of 
being stalked. But the jurors probably are intimately familiar with cul­
tural narratives of stalking. Kamir points to Fatal Attraction as the im­
age that might first come to mind as a juror struggles to understand 
what a reasonable person would feel in the victim's situation. Since the 
stalking victim in Fatal Attraction (played by Michael Douglas) is a 
fairly normal, empathetic, rational person, it is easy for the jury to use 
that fictional character as a model for the fictitious legal standard they 
are supposed to apply (pp. 192-94). Kamir argues that by asking the 
jury to evaluate what an ill-defined "ideal average man" would feel, 
the reasonable person standard "invites uncritical import of cultural 
images into the legal discourse, thereby potentially allowing moral 
panic to penetrate the law" (p. 186). 
But how does this differ from any legal judgment that asks jurors 
to determine how they would have acted in another's position? Our 
societal narratives are a key reference point whenever we are asked to. 
determine the appropriate action in an unfamiliar situation. Indeed, 
how are we ever to guess how a "reasonable person" would have acted 
except through the stories we tell, both fact and fiction, about the ac­
tions of others? Consider the self-defense scenario discussed earlier. 
Few people have ever been assaulted at gunpoint, but almost all have 
seen movies where heroic figures protect themselves and their 
families. When asked to evaluate whether a reasonable person would 
have perceived a need to use deadly force in self-defense, a juror 
39. Does the stalking victim's experience render her more deserving of special treat­
ment than the average innocent person? Kamir's analysis suggests the answer is yes: since 
she has already been the victim of a stalker, our legal system should be sensitive to these 
scars and avoid scrutinizing her in a way that might trigger fears that would not register in a 
person who had never been stalked. 
40. For reasons such as this, the MPC has generally abandoned use of reasonable person 
analysis in favor of evaluating the defendant's subjective mental states. See Kyron Huigens, 
Correspondence, What Is and Is Not Pathological in Criminal Law, 101 MICH. L. REV. 811, 
815-19 (2002) 
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might certainly recall these cinematic images. It is not just for stalking 
that the reasonable person standard "facilitates the superimposition of 
film scenarios and victims onto the performance of the story in courts 
of law" (p. 192). Once again, Kamir's analysis can teach us broad 
lessons about the effects of narrative on legal standards, but readers 
are on their own to discover what those broader implications might be. 
IV. STALKING SOLUTIONS FOR A CONFLICTED SOCIETY 
Kamir's exploration of stalking narratives powerfully highlights the 
underlying incoherencies of current stalking law. The basic problem is 
that our society is deeply conflicted about how to deal with stalking. 
While recent passage of anti-stalking laws shows a concerted attempt 
"to liberate women from wide-spread, oppressive social norms" that 
condone stalking, the "liberation" is not yet complete. The oppressive 
patriarchal norms still pervade societal consciousness (p. 191). Since 
the reasonable person standard "is 'a mechanism for importing a pre­
existing societal consensus into the law,' "41 Kamir argues that it 
should not be used when there is no clear societal consensus about the 
proper bounds of the behavior (p. 191). She argues that the reasonable 
person test should be eliminated from the definition of stalking, and 
suggests that instead "[t]he legislature should bear sole authority for 
the determination of such fundamental value judgments; it should not 
pretend to assume social consensus where it does not exist" (p. 191). 
Kamir's critique of the reasonable person standard is valid and 
powerful, and she argues quite convincingly that the ideal solution 
would be to abandon this standard entirely and adopt rules focusing 
on the defendant's specific intent, course of conduct, and mens rea (p. 
212). Yet it is unclear why legislatures stand in a good position to fix 
the problem through firmer control of the underlying value judgments. 
The anti-stalking laws actually enacted show that legislators are also 
deeply conflicted about stalking, arguably more conflicted than society 
at large (pp. 181-86). Indeed, right after Kamir suggests that legisla­
tures take sole control of the value judgments needed for coherent 
stalking laws, she points out that legislators are confused by stalking 
and suspicious about making it a serious crime (pp. 191-92). In draft­
ing stalking statutes, legislators evidence "a fear of hysterical, hyper­
sensitive women" and do not always take the harm from stalking seri-
ously (p. 191). 
· 
To overcome these biases, Kamir urges legislatures to deeply 
engage in a critical study of stalking narratives, for this would be 
"enlightening and helpful in understanding the subtleties of the effects 
stalking may have on targeted victims; it may shed light on the 
41. P. 191 (quoting Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The 
Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177 (1990)). 
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damage, anxiety, and anguish they may suffer" (pp. 204-05). A deep 
study of stalking narratives would undoubtedly improve legislatures' 
ability to craft a comprehensive stalking law - by the end of this 
book, Kamir has certainly convinced the reader of at least this much. 
Yet no real legislature has the time or inclination for this study. In the 
real world, the legislators' conflicts and biases will continue to exist. It 
is thus unclear why legislatures should "bear sole authority" to dictate 
fundamental value judgments that would displace the problematic 
reasonable person standard. 
Indeed, a jury may actually be in a better position than a legisla­
ture to accept the legitimacy of a stalking victim's fear. Since stalking 
often involves a pattern of actions innocent on their own, legislators 
considering the matter abstractly may indeed be suspicious of "hys­
terical, hypersensitive women." Jurors, hearing the real-life stalking 
story of an actual victim, may be able to understand the fear she de­
scribes because they have experienced this fear vicariously through 
stalking stories. Because of the emotional manipulation of horror 
films, jurors who have never experienced stalking might be able to 
understand the fear that a repeated pattern of unwanted activity can 
cause. 
While stalking narratives do skew the perspective of jurors to some 
extent, priming them to expect that stalkers and their victims will fit 
into narrowly defined gender and social roles, many of these social 
biases are endemic to all determinations of the jury. The archetypical 
stalking story and the stalking story told by the victim may not per­
fectly match, but at least the vast variety of stalking stories that per­
vade our culture has taught us that not everything fits neatly into a 
simple pattern.42 While stalking stories are far from a perfect aid to 
judging this crime, at least these narratives give us a glimpse of the ter­
ror of being stalked and put us in a position to take seriously the vic­
tim's claim. Stalking stories can at least teach us that much. 
42. The diversity of stalking stories is immediately apparent, far more so than the 
underlying patriarchal themes that form the focus of Kamir's attention. The genre, after all, 
encompasses ancient Hebrew myths, Dracula, and the "watchful eye" of our legal system. 
"Diverse" is perhaps an understatement. 
